A calculus of channel security properties is presented which allows the analysis and comparison of protocols for establishing secure channels in a distributed open system at a high level of abstraction. A channel is characterized by its direction, its time of availability and its security properties. Cryptographic primitives as well as trust relations are interpreted as transformations for channel security properties, and a cryptographic protocol can be viewed as a sequence of such transformations. A protocol thus allows to transform a set of secure channels established during an initial setup phase, together with a set of insecure channels available during operation of the system, into the set of secure channels speci ed by the security requirements. The necessary and su cient requirements for establishing a secure channel between two entities A and B are characterized in terms of secure channels to be made available during the initial setup phase and in terms of the minimal trust A and B must have into other entities or into trusted third parties.
Introduction
The fast development of worldwide distributed information systems and communication networks (e.g. the World Wide Web on the Internet) and their use for electronic commerce leads to security problems whose solution becomes increasingly important as the use of these systems grows 7] . While for some small-scale systems security can perhaps be viewed simply as a desirable feature, integral security is a mandatory requirement for any large-scale information system to be merely operational, and for security-critical systems to be acceptable to its users.
Relevant security goals include the protection of sensitive data against eavesdropping, the authentication of messages (including sender and receiver identity, content, time of generation and possibly other parameters of a message), the non-repudiation of sending or receipt The purpose of this paper is to provide a simple and straight-forward formalism for illustrating and comparing the various approaches to security in distributed systems. The emphasis of our approach is on the simplicity and expressive power of the model. Unlike many previous formal treatments of security and authentication in distributed systems 4], 9], 23], 26], it is not intended to be applied for the design or the security veri cation of protocols. It rather allows to illustrate in a simple manner several interesting aspects of distributed system security: the minimal requirements and trust relations necessary for achieving a secure channel between two entities in a distributed system, the timing constraints on the involved communication channels, the duality between authenticity and con dentiality, and the distinguishing features between secret-key and public-key cryptography. It also provides a black-box view of cryptographic primitives, showing that a digital signature scheme can be interpreted as the dual of a symmetric cryptosystem and a public-key cryptosystem can be interpreted as the dual of a message authentication code.
Cryptographic primitives and trust relations are both interpreted as transformations for channel security properties, and a cryptographic protocol can be viewed as a sequence of such transformations of both types. A protocol thus makes it possible to transform a set of secure channels established during an initial setup phase, together with a set of insecure channels available during operation of the system, into the set of secure channels speci ed by the security requirements.
The minimal requirements for achieving a secure channel between two entities in a distributed system are characterized in terms of secure channels to be made available in an initial setup phase and in terms of the minimal required trust relations between users and/or between users and trusted authorities. Several types of protocols are reviewed within the presented framework, but it is not a goal of this paper to develop new protocols. We do not distinguish between di erent types and degrees of trust 26], but our model could be extended in this direction.
Many of the issues addressed in this paper have been discussed before 3], 18], 20]. These models di er with respect to their expressive power, the degrees of formality, and the types of channels that are modeled. Rueppel's approach 20] illustrates the importance of con dentiality and authenticity as basic security goals but does not address trust as a fundamental ingredient of security bootstrapping in distributed system. In contrast, Rangan 18] addresses trust relations between users and authentication servers in a model that is based on a logic of belief. The most advanced model, based on the formal speci cation language Z, is due to Boyd 3] . Our independently developed framework has several similarities with Boyd's, which was rst brought to the authors' attention after a preliminary version of this paper had been presented at ESORICS '94.
Despite its relations and similarities to these previous approaches, this paper di ers in several aspects. Cryptographic primitives are characterized completely in terms of the transformations they permit, and this leads to insights into the duality between certain primitives. The clear distinction between initialization and communication phases, the explicit consideration of the insecure communication channels needed in the communication phase, and the explicit representation of trust-based transformations allow the comparison of various key management approaches. While in 3] the intuitive aspects of secret keys and secure channels are made precise in formal de nitions, we emphasize their intuitive nature by stating them as axioms. We hope that the intuitive nature of our model nicely complements previous approaches.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes a classi cation of channel security properties and Section 3 provides a complete list of cryptographic transformations of such channel security properties. Sections 6 and 4 discuss the necessary and su cient condition for establishing a secure channel between two users in an open network, with and without exploiting trust relations, respectively, and security transformations based on trust relations are introduced in Section 5. In Section 7, several approaches to bootstrapping security in an open network are compared, and Section 8 concludes the paper with a brief comparison between secret-key and public-key cryptography in the context of distributed systems security.
Classi cation of channel security properties
At a high level of abstraction, a communication channel can be viewed as a means for transporting a message from a source entity (at the channel input) to a destination entity (at the channel output). In this paper we will remain at this high level of abstraction without considering any details of communication protocols. The term entity can thus either refer to a user, to an application, to the network or physical layer (according to the OSI model) of a systems communications interface, or to any other logical endpoint of a communication.
In a communication system it is possible that, either intentionally or due to information leakage, a message is received by several entities. Similarly, it is possible that, either by design of the system or due to a security problem, one of several entities could potentially be the sender of a message received by the receiver(s).
The duality of source and destination of a message or, equivalently, the duality of input and output of a channel, is re ected in the duality of the two fundamental security goals for messages (or channels). They refer to the exclusiveness of access to the channel input or the channel output:
Con dentiality: A channel provides con dentiality if its output is exclusively accessible to a speci ed receiver and this fact is known to (or believed by) a sender on the channel.
Authenticity: Similarly, a channel provides authenticity if its input is exclusively accessible to a speci ed sender and this fact is known to (or believed by) a receiver. It is important to note that con dentiality and authenticity refer to a sender's and a receiver's state of belief, respectively. It is usually impossible to establish the truth of such a belief, and in practical applications it is the goal of the communicating parties to collect su cient evidence for justifying such a belief. Such evidence for channel security attributes can either be based on physical assumptions (e.g. authenticity guaranteed by speaker identi cation, condentiality guaranteed by the tamper-proofness of a module), on cryptography (e.g. encrypted communication over an otherwise insecure channel, digital signatures), or a combination of these.
As mentioned above, con dentiality is a security property that refers to a sender's viewpoint: the sender wants to assure that the channel's output is accessible only to the intended receiver. However, there are more subtle aspects to con dentiality which will not be discussed in detail here. For instance, the sender may implicitly have to trust the receiver to keep the message con dential. Here we will assume that a sender who wishes to establish a con dential channel has decided beforehand that the receiver can be trusted to see the message. Moreover, addressing the question of who is actually interested in the con dentiality of a message, it could actually be the receiver who wants to keep a message (e.g. concerning him or her) to be received con dentially. However, our viewpoint will be that this is only possible when he can convince the sender to assure the con dentiality of the channel, thus again turning con dentiality into the sender's security goal.
Con dentiality and authenticity are independent and dual security properties. One can be available without the other, as will be discussed below. Based on these two fundamental security properties, channels can be classi ed into four di erent types according to whether they provide none, one or both of the properties.
Channels are denoted by the symbol ?! and allow to transmit, at a given time, a message of unspeci ed length from an input to an output. The symbol attached to one side of the channel symbol ?! indicates that the user at the corresponding end of the channel has exclusive access to the channel from the opposite entity's point of view. We will also need to consider channels that introduce a delay, i.e., for which the input message must be speci ed at some time t 1 while the message appears at the output only at some later time t 2 > t 1 . For the various types of security properties, such channels will be denoted by A Before we characterize cryptographic primitives as transformations of channel security properties, we list a few trivial non-cryptographic transformations. Transformations are denoted by the preconditions for the transformation followed by the symbol =), and followed by the resulting channel. A given channel can be used as input to an arbitrary number of transformations, meaning that the actual message transmitted on that channel consists of several components. ?! C (2) Note that the input message for the resulting virtual channel A t 4 t 1 ]
?! C from A to C must be xed by A at time t 1 while it is received by C only at the later time t 4 .
It is appropriate to discuss brie y availability as a third fundamental security requirement (in addition to con dentiality and authenticity). Availability of an information or communication system, (for example the prevention of system failures and of denial of service attacks 14]) is often even more crucial than for instance the con dentiality of data. However, the techniques for achieving availability are completely di erent. In most cases, a system`s availability, even in the presence of malicious attacks, can in principle be made arbitrarily high by introducing a su cient amount of redundancy. Our goal is to achieve security in an insecure but reasonably reliable open network. Therefore the reliability of channels and entities is not explicitly represented in our model. For example, for the A t 4 t 1 ]
?! C channel in transformation (2) to be available, B must be reliable and available. However, this subtlety will not arise in this paper because transformation (2) will only be used in situations where B (rather than A) wants the message to reach C, and hence is reliable in its own interest.
When the channels from A to B and from B to C in transformation (2) both provide either con dentiality or authenticity or both, then so would the channel from A to C, but only when A or C, or both A and C, respectively, believe they can trust B. Trust-based transformations will be discussed in Section 5.
Cryptographic security transformations
In this section we present a systematic discussion of the well-known cryptographic primitives (symmetric encryption, message authentication code, public-key cryptosystem and digital signature scheme) by interpreting them as transformations of channel security properties. In this paper, cryptographic systems are treated as black boxes without considering their mathematical realization.
Symmetric encryption and message authentication codes
A symmetric cryptosystem or cipher is often assumed to provide implicit message authentication; the fact that a message is encrypted with a certain key \proves" the sender's knowledge of the key. However, this observation is valid only under the assumption that plaintext is su ciently redundant; this allows to distinguish meaningless messages (resulting from the decryption of a fraudulent ciphertext) from valid messages. Moreover, certain types of ciphers (e.g. additive stream ciphers) provide no implicit message authentication because individual bits in the ciphertext can be ipped selectively, resulting in the corresponding plaintext bits to be ipped. The latter problem can be solved by appending to a given message a cryptographic hash value of the message. In the sequel we therefore assume without loss of generality that a symmetric cipher provides both con dentiality and authenticity. A message authentication code (MAC), also based on a secret-key cryptosystem, is used to assure a message's authenticity only.
In our framework, a symmetric cipher can be interpreted as follows. The basic security transformation provided by a symmetric cipher is to transfer the security of a channel available at some time t 2 to an insecure channel available at some later time t 4 . The times t 1 and t 3 are included for the sake of generality and will be used later, but the reader can for the remainder of Section 3 just as well assume that t 2 = t 1 ? B (4) It is interesting to notice that a symmetric cryptosystem can also be used to transfer con dentiality without authenticity: ?! B
The above transformation can also be achieved when the authenticated channel is available prior to the con dential channel. For this purpose, a secret key K is generated by A who uses the A ?! B
While a symmetric cryptosystem can transfer con dentiality without authenticity (transformation (5)), it is important to note that it cannot transfer authenticity without con dentiality. The latter transformation is achieved by digital signatures and is one of the major advantages of public-key cryptography.
On the other hand, a symmetric cryptosystem or a MAC-scheme can also be used to convert a con dential channel into an authenticated channel. If A sends a secret key to B over the con dential channel, then A can later recognize messages encrypted with this key as authentic from B. However, since B cannot verify that A is indeed the sender of the secret key, the con dentiality of encrypted messages is not guaranteed. ? B (8) Note that when B receives several (not authenticated) secret keys from various entities he can authenticate a message for each key separately without need for knowing which entities had sent the keys. When the second channel in transformation (8) ? B (9) The timing constraint in (4), (8) and (9) di ers from that in (3), (5) and (6) because in the former three B can send the reply only after receiving the message from A.
Public-key cryptosystems
The basic transformation provided by an (asymmetric) public-key cryptosystem is to transform the authenticity of a channel into the con dentiality of a channel available at some later time: ? B (11) Our framework demonstrates that a public-key distribution system as de ned by Di e and Hellman 6], if combined with a symmetric cryptosystem for encryption with the generated bilateral secret key, is equivalent to a public-key cryptosystem in the sense that it provides exactly the same transformations (10) and (11) . Transformation (11) corresponds to the usual description of a public-key distribution system as allowing two entities to generate a shared secret key by communicating only over insecure but authenticated channels. Transformation (10) can be achieved as follows: User A generates a Di e-Hellman key pair and sends the public key to B (in an authenticated manner). User B also generates a Di e-Hellman key pair, computes the secret key shared with A, encrypts the message with this secret key and sends the encrypted message and the public key over the insecure channel to A.
A comparison of transformations (8) and (10) suggests that a public-key cryptosystem is, in a certain sense, the dual of a symmetric message authentication code (MAC): the former permits the conversion of authenticity into con dentiality while the latter provides the inverse conversion. ?! B (12) When the second channel is con dential, then so is the resulting channel:
A ?! B which is identical to (7) . A comparison of transformations (5) and (12) demonstrates that a digital signature scheme is, in a certain sense, the dual of a symmetric cryptosystem: they allow to transfer authenticity and con dentiality, respectively.
Limitations of cryptographic security transformations
The transformations discussed in the previous section can be interpreted as tools for moving or replacing channel symbols (?!) while keeping the security symbols attached to the corresponding users. For example, transformation (3) can be interpreted as replacing the channel ?! while keeping the 's attached to A and B. Hence this transformation permits to transfer the security properties from an initially available secure channel to a later available insecure channel between the same two entities. In this context it is important to notice that a security symbol is attached to the corresponding entity rather than to the corresponding channel and is valid only with respect to the opposite entity.
It is obvious that 's cannot be \created" or copied from one user to another by cryptographic transformations. Furthermore, the fact that an entity A is exclusive in a certain sense (with respect to another entity B) cannot be transferred to a third entity C (unless C trusts B, see Section 5). Hence security symbols must be established by non-cryptographic means such as authentication based on speaker identi cation or on the veri cation of a passport. These observations are obvious but appear to be impossible to prove formally and are therefore stated as an axiom. By a cryptographic transformation we mean one that does not exploit trust relations.
Axiom 1. There exists no cryptographic transformation allowing to \create" a or to copy a from one user to another. Furthermore, a cryptographic transformation can copy a only between channels with identical endpoints.
A When only cryptographic transformations are available, this condition is also necessary. Proof. The fact that the conditions are necessary follows from Axiom 1. For showing that they are also su cient it is easy to verify that for each of the four combinations of preconditions consistent with conditions (1) and (2) of the proposition there exists a transformation or a sequence of transformations for creating a secure channel. For instance, every con dential channel can be transformed into an authenticated channel by application of transformation (8) and the obtained scenario consisting of two complementary authenticated channels can be transformed into a secure channel by transformation (11) . Now transformations (3) and (4) can be applied to complete the proof. 
Trust-based security transformations
From the point of view of security in distributed systems, Proposition 1 is pessimistic: it states that in order to establish a secure channel between a pair of entities by cryptographic means there must previously exist some secure channel(s) between these entities. This implies that the number of secure channels needed to achieve security between any pair of entities grows quadratically in the number of entities.
In a large distributed system one therefore needs transformations based on trust relations that are not restricted by Axiom 1. Trust is a fundamental ingredient for secure communications in large distributed systems. Various types and degrees of trust can be distinguished (e.g., see 26]), but for the sake of simplicity of the model, such a distinction will not be made in this paper, although our model could be extended in this direction.
When a user B trusts another user or third party T to send only authenticated information (i.e., T is trusted to properly authenticate its sources of information as well as not to fraudulently distribute inaccurate information), then B can use T to connect two authenticated channels A ?! B (13) This transformation is a generalization of transformation (2) . Note that A need not trust T because authenticity refers to the receiver's (not the sender's) state of belief.
Similarly, when a user A trusts another user or third party T to treat secret information con dentially and to send it only to entities approved by A, then A can use T to connect two con dential channels, provided that t 3 ?! B
The following transformation cannot be derived from the previously described transformations because the two messages sent over the channels A ?! B must be correlated. This transformation corresponds to the classical secret key distribution by a trusted third party and requires that A and B both trust T to generate a random session key and to keep it con dential. It also requires the use of a symmetric cryptosystem and is hence both cryptographic and trust-based.
T t 2 t 1 ] ?! A T t 4 t 3 ]
?! B A ?! B (15) Instead of generating and distributing a secret key for a symmetric cryptosystem, a trusted third party T could generate a secret-key/public-key pair for a public-key cryptosystem or a digital signature scheme and send the secret key to an entity A over a con dential channel and the public key to other entities (e.g. B) over authenticated channels. When B trusts T then A can use an insecure channel to establish an authenticated channel to B. ? B channel. The two channel uses by T in transformations (15) and (16) are correlated. This is generally undesirable because in a large scale system di erent entities' interactions with T should be independent.
The probably most important application of digital signatures (transformation (12)) is for achieving the trust-based transformation (13) ?! B t 6 > t 4 9 > > = > > ; (12) =) T t 6 t 5 ] ?! B (18) When B trusts T we can now apply transformation (13) ?! B (20) Because we have assumed that t 3 > t 2 , the applications of transformations (2) and (13) ?! B can be derived from the scenario of Figure 1 if and only if t 2 < t 5 < t 6 and only if B trusts T. Two applications of a digital signature scheme are required, rst by T for certifying A's public key and secondly by A to authenticate actual messages. In this model of public-key certi cation, user A serves as a relay according to transformation (2) for a message (his own public key) conceptually sent from T to B.
6. The necessary and su cient condition for a secure channel A ! B between two entities
For two reasons a model based on a single trusted third party T as discussed in the previous section is unrealistic in many real-world scenarios of large distributed systems. First, there generally exists no single third party that is trusted by every entity. Second, a secure channel between A and T is usually established by A visiting T, presenting a passport and exchanging the necessary messages with T. In a world-wide system it is impractical for every entity to visit such a world-wide trusted third party T.
The second problem can be solved by using more than one trusted third party with a geographically su ciently dense representation and typically organized in a hierarchy. However,
Inspecting the trust-based transformations of the previous section leads to the following characterization of the limitations of trust-based transformations. It appears impossible to prove formally and is therefore stated as an axiom. The symbol ??? stands for any channel of either direction where the symbol can either be deleted or replaced by . Axiom 2. There exists no trust-based transformation allowing to \create" a or to copy a from one user to another. However, a trust-based transformation can copy the from a channel A ??? T to become the in the channel A ??? B, but only if at least two conditions are satis ed: (1) there also exists a channel T ??? B, and (2) B trusts T.
When a security derivation for a channel leading to or from entity B implies that B must trust some entity T 0 and further implies that T 0 must trust some entity T, then this derivation also implies that B must trust T. If We also refer to 18] for a discussion on the transitivity of the trust relation. The following proposition characterizes the necessary and su cient conditions for establishing an authenticated channel between two entities in a distributed system. Proposition 2. Under the full connectivity assumption it is the necessary and su cient condition for establishing an authenticated channel from A to B from time t 0 onwards (A t ?! B for t t 0 ), or a con dential channel from B to A from time t 0 onwards (A t ? B for t t 0 ), that there exists a connected path of channels (of arbitrary individual directions) from A to B such that (1) every channel in the path is available at some time earlier than t 0 and has a attached to that end of the channel which is closer to A, and (2) B trusts every intermediate entity on the path.
Proof. Assume that every con dential but not authenticated channel (?! ) is converted by transformation (8) into an authenticated channel ( ? ). After these transformations a path according to the proposition is a complete chain of authenticated channels from A to B where B trusts all the intermediate entities in the chain. According to the sequence of transformations (17) to (20) discussed in the previous section one can repeatedly combine the two links of the 
Bootstrapping security in distributed systems
In the previous section we have discussed the theoretical limitations to establishing secure channels in a distributed system. This section reviews, within our framework and at a high level of abstraction, some previously proposed protocols for establishing a secure channel between two entities.
Protocols based on symmetric cryptography
Consider a trusted third party T to which every user establishes a secure channel during the initialization phase. Hence we can exploit channels T t 1
?! A and T t 2 ?! B for some t 1 and t 2 . The rst two protocols are discussed for illustration purposes only and for the sake of completeness, but these protocols are not used in distributed systems.
Distribution of bilateral secret keys
The probably simplest protocol, which is used in some military and diplomatic applications with small user groups, is for T to generate a bilateral secret key for every pair of entities and to use the secure channels for sending each entity the corresponding subset of bilateral keys. This 
Message or session key relaying by a trusted server
The major drawback of the above approach is the quadratic growth of the number of session keys generated and distributed by T. This problem can be avoided when T is available on-line for all the entities. The simplest such protocol, involving transformations (9), (13) and (14), is when T serves as a relay for messages. When A wants to send a message to B, he or she encrypts it with the secret key shared with T and sends it to T using a channel A ?! T. T can decrypt the message, reencrypt it with the secret key shared with B, and send the new ciphertext to B using a T ?! B channel.
A more reasonable protocol additionally requiring direct interaction between A and B can be derived from the so-called wide-mouthed-frog protocol proposed by Burrows 4] . Here, T merely relays a session key generated by A for communication between A and B, and the subsequent encrypted communication between A and B takes place over an insecure channel.
Session key distribution by a trusted server
The following key distribution paradigm is used in the Kerberos 21], 16] and in the KryptoKnight 13] systems. One of its advantages is that users need not be capable of generating \good" encryption keys. Otway and Rees 17] have proposed a similar protocol with a di erent sequence of interactions with the trusted server T. Figure 3 illustrates the scenario: During the initialization phase, T agrees on a bilateral secret key with every entity (in our example at time t 1 with A and at time t 2 with B).
When A wants to communicate with B she uses the A t 3
?! T channel for sending a request to T. T generates a session key, sends the encrypted session key to A, together with the same session key encrypted for B (i.e., encrypted with the key shared by T and B). A can then initiate a communication with B by sending the encrypted session key. Note that this protocol, like that discussed in Section 7.1.1, makes use of transformation (15) , but in a quite di erent manner. In particular, T does not send the session key directly to B. Figure 4 . The channel scenario needed for hierarchical public key certi cation involving three trusted third parties with T 1 at the top of the hierarchy.
A formal derivation using security transformations demonstrates the constraints on the timing of the channels and the trust relations required to achieve a secure channel between A and B: both A and B must trust each authority on the path between A and B. The sequence of transformations resulting in an authenticated channel A t 9
?! B from A to B is shown in Figure 5 . ?! B from A to B.
Note that this sequence of transformations requires that t 1 < t 2 , t 3 < t 4 , t 5 < t 7 and t 4 < t 2 < t 9 and also that B trusts T 1 ; T 2 and T 3 . The condition t 4 < t 2 < t 9 is an interpretation of the fact that T 2 must provide A with T 1 's public key as well as with T 1 's certi cate for his own public key.
A similar sequence of transformations results in a channel A t 9
? B under the conditions t 8 < t 7 , t 6 < t 5 , t 4 < t 2 and t 5 < t 7 < t 9 In large and heterogeneous distributed systems, hierarchical certi cation schemes with a tree-shaped topology are critical for two reasons. First, if a single third party is compromised, this leads to the failure of a substantial part of a system. Second, and more importantly, both users must trust every third party on the certi cation path, i.e., a certi cation path can be at most as strong as its weakest link. As a consequence, a user's trust in an third party T i is in most cases based on a higher-level authority's recommendation issued according to some policy. Such delegation of trust within a rigid hierarchical structure appears to be quite critical in many application scenarios. Trust management is an important emerging research area in distributed system security (e.g., see 26], 1]).
It is crucial in large and heterogeneous distributed systems that not only the communication links, but also the certi cation paths be highly redundant. Zimmermann's Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) software 27] (see also 22]) allows for a very exible use of certi cates, leaving the responsibility completely in the hands of the users. PGP exploits Proposition 2 and Corollary 3 in their full generality. The need for a international public-key infrastructure is also discussed in 5]. However, it is possible that a more general approach allowing to fully express and exploit various degrees of trust and combine certi cates of di erent trust levels is needed. A rst approach in this direction is described in 1].
Concluding remarks
When compared to secret-key cryptography, the application of public-key cryptography o ers two major potential advantages in key management protocols.
First, protocols based on secret-key cryptography require a trusted third party T to be available on-line 21], 13] for all entities or, alternatively, that the interactions between individual entities and T are correlated, thus creating a key management complexity that is quadratic in the number of entities (see Section 7.1). In contrast, the protocols based on public-key certicates described in Section 7.2 require each entity only to perform an initial interaction with one or several certi cation authorities, which are not involved later in establishing sessions between entities. However, it should be pointed out that this advantage may have to be sacri ced to some extent in a large-scale application because the revocation of invalid certi cates may require an on-line examination of a certi cate revocation list.
The second and more crucial advantage of public-key cryptography is that it permits a completely exible trust management. A certi cate-based protocol allows every entity to individually decide which entities it trusts for issuing certi cates 27] or, more generally, for issuing recommendations. In contrast, secret-key protocols are based on a xed structure of key servers. An entity can generally not choose which inter-realm path of servers 10] should be used for establishing a session key, in particular because the two communicating entities' trust relations may not be compatible. An entity is hence forced to trust all servers in a path speci ed by the system rather than by itself. Many of these servers (or the organizations running these servers) may be unknown to this user. As an alternative, it is conceivable that a global distributed web of trust and public-key certi cates will emerge, as was suggested by Phil Zimmerman 27] .
The discussion of Sections 2 and 3 and Proposition 1 illustrate the duality between authenticity and con dentiality. While authenticated channels without con dentiality ( ?!) are used routinely in distributed systems, Propositions 1,2 and 3 suggest that con dential channels without authenticity (?! ) could be used equally well. It remains an interesting open question how such channels could be obtained in a realistic scenario.
To illustrate that such channels need not be completely unrealistic, consider for instance a user B with several accounts on various machines on a large network with cryptographically protected channels between his personal computer and these machines. It may be reasonable to assume that an eavesdropper could simultaneously access messages sent by another user
A to a few of these machines, but that he is unable to access all the messages sent to these machines at a given time. In such a scenario, a A ?! B channel to be exploited in one of the transformations (5), (6), (8), (9), and (14) could for instance be established by A by dividing a secret key S into various pieces such that all pieces are required to compute S, and sending (without authenticity, and preferably from accounts on di erent machines) the individual pieces to B's mailboxes on the various machines.
